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Abstract 
 
Various theories of religion hypothesize a connection between death anxiety 
and religiosity. In particular, Terror Management Theory’s worldview defense 
hypothesis predicts that death anxiety is lowest among very religious and 
irreligious individuals, and highest among uncertain individuals. Likewise, the 
supposition that death anxiety motivates religious belief, which in turn 
mitigates death anxiety predicts that religiosity increases with death anxiety 
among nonbelievers, and that death anxiety decreases as religiosity increases 
among believers. In both cases, a curvilinear relationship—specifically, an 
inverted-U curve—is predicted. We extracted 202 effect sizes from 100 studies 
for an “omnibus” religiosity meta-analysis, and six meta-analyses that examine 
particular dimensions of religiosity. We found high heterogeneity and a weak 
negative association between death anxiety and religiosity. A closer 
examination revealed that 10 of the 11 studies that directly tested for 
curvilinearity provided some support for an inverted-U pattern. The 
curvilinearity hypothesis cannot be ruled out, but more evidence—particularly 
on nonreligious individuals, and in nonwestern, nonAbrahamic contexts—is 
needed. 
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The religious correlates of death anxiety: 
A systematic review and meta-analysis 
 
A brief history of thanatocentric theories of religion 
The notion that religious belief is motivated by fear has a long and venerable 
history. Even from classical times, philosophers have made this link, as 
Petronius’s oft-quoted line—primus in orbe deos fecit timor—indicates: it was fear 
that first made gods in the world. In perhaps the earliest systematic naturalistic 
account of religion, Lucretius Carus (c. 99 BCE–c. 55 BCE) proposed that the 
uncertainties and perils of mortal life lead us to believe that gods control the 
natural world; he did not, however, suppose that the belief in gods was 
comforting. To the contrary, Lucretius argued that ideas about divine wrath 
and postmortem judgement increase fear, including the fear of death. Much 
later, the British anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1939) would revisit this 
line of argument, specifically in the context of religious and magical rituals. 
Prescriptions about ritual performance, he argued, generate fear based on the 
potential for failure to perform the rite appropriately. However, for most of 
Western intellectual history, the proposed relationship between religion and 
fear—and the fear of death in particular—has been characterized by two causal 
claims: first, that fear motivates religious belief, and second, that religious belief 
mitigates fear.  
 The fear of death has repeatedly featured in theorizing about the 
evolutionary and psychological origins of religion in precisely these terms. 
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David Hume (1757/2008, p. 140), for example, hypothesized that it is “the 
ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread 
of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food 
and other necessaries” (emphasis added) that led our ancestors to see “the first 
obscure traces of divinity”. Similarly, Ludwig Feuerbach (1851/1967) proposed 
that religion arises out of our feelings of finitude, the chief source of which is 
the knowledge of our mortality, so much so that, “If man did not die, if he lived 
forever, if there were no such thing as death, there would be no religion” (p. 
33). This focus on death sharpens further in the 20th century, particularly in the 
work of the anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and Ernest Becker, and 
more recently in social psychological research on Terror Management Theory. 
 For both Malinowski and Becker, the fear of death is a given, a 
psychobiological endowment from our evolutionary past: the fear of death is 
the affective complement to the desire for self-preservation. Having asserted 
that the fear of death is the “result of some deep-seated instincts common to 
man and animals” (Malinowski, 1948, p. 50), theorists have also maintained that 
human beings’ existential anxieties are unique to the extent that we are self-
aware, and therefore also aware that death may be the end of our selves. 
Consequently, it is specifically the fear of annihilation—that is, of the cessation 
of life, conscious experiences, and personhood—that occupies Malinowski (e.g., 
1948, p. 50), Becker (e.g., 1973, p. 66), and their intellectual descendants, rather 
than fears that we might share with nonhuman animals, such as aversions to 
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pain. This fear of annihilation is, for Malinowski (1948, p. 47), religion’s most 
powerful driver: thus, “Of all sources of religion”, he writes, “the supreme and 
final crisis of life—death—is of the greatest importance”. Becker (1973, p. 27) 
takes it further still, extending the theory to cover all of human cultural 
achievements, such that everything human beings do in our “symbolic world is 
an attempt to deny and overcome [our] grotesque fate”. This is not to deny that 
Becker prioritizes religion; indeed, religion is, to Becker, “the ‘best’ illusion 
under which to live” (1973, p. 202), and all other cultural “immortality projects” 
(e.g., nationalism, ethnocentrism, artistic and scientific endeavor) are functional 
facsimiles of belief systems that offer literal immortality.   
 
Terror Management Theory 
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) 
adopts Becker’s theory of culture more generally, and of religion in particular, 
extracting its core insights from their original psychoanalytic context and 
reinterpreting them in terms of evolutionary and social psychological theories. 
Like Becker, TMT also begins with the observation that human beings are, 
perhaps uniquely, aware of their mortality. This self-awareness elicits crippling 
existential anxiety, which in turn motivates us to seek immortality, whether 
literal or symbolic. Literal immortality is pursued through afterlife concepts 
(e.g., immortal souls, heaven, reincarnation, nirvana), whereas symbolic 
immortality is pursued through lasting culturally valued identifications and 
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achievements, and the increased self-esteem they engender (Dechesne et al. 
2003). Religious worldviews, at least those with comforting afterlife beliefs, 
offer both literal (via afterlife concepts) and symbolic immortality (via 
membership in durable religious organizations, notions of chosenness and 
cosmic significance, etc.), and are therefore the culturally dominant means of 
relieving existential anxiety: as Vail et al. (2010, p. 65) claim, “there may be no 
antidote to the human fear of death quite like religion”.   
 This distinction between literal and symbolic immortality raises the 
possibility of a tension within Terror Management Theory. According to the 
standard worldview defense account of terror management, it is the bolstering of 
our worldviews—regardless of content—that mitigates death anxiety; we are 
therefore motivated to defend our worldviews against the worldviews of 
others. There is an impressive amount of evidence for this account, as recently 
reported in a meta-analysis by Burke, Martens, and Faucher’s (2010), reminders 
of death consistently lead individuals to enhance their self-esteem, defend their 
cultural values, favour their ingroups (including minimal ingroups; Harmon-
Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996), and denigrate outgroups. Note that 
on this view, even atheism might serve the same terror management function as 
religion more traditionally construed, insofar as atheism represents a 
worldview to be defended; furthermore, there seems to be no reason to doubt 
this, given that even worldview defense effects can occur in minimal group 
contexts (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012; but see Laundau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 
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2004). Nevertheless, some recent research suggests that the motivation to 
pursue literal immortality may take priority over the desire to defend our 
preexisting and culturally dominant beliefs. For example, Norenzayan and 
Hansen (2006) found that Christians were more willing to endorse belief in 
culturally unfamiliar gods when they were reminded of death (but see Vail, 
Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012). And recent evidence suggests that even atheists 
benefit from afterlife beliefs (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012).  
 
Predictions from thanatocentric theories 
As we have discussed, thanatocentric theories of religion tend to comprise two 
causal claims about the relationship between religiosity and the fear of death. 
First, there is the claim that death anxiety motivates religious belief. This might 
lead us to expect that more death anxious individuals are also more attracted to 
religion than their stoical peers: a positive correlation between death anxiety and 
religious belief. Second, there is the claim that religious belief mitigates death 
anxiety. These claims might lead one to predict that more religious individuals 
enjoy reduced levels of anxiety than their secular peers: a negative correlation 
between death anxiety and religious belief. We seem to have a contradiction on 
our hands. The contradiction is resolved, however, when we see the two 
hypotheses as occupying different halves of an inverted U-shaped curve (see 
Figure 1). That is, among religious nonbelievers, those who are more afraid of 
death are more tempted toward religion, whereas among believers, those who 
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are more certain in their conviction enjoy the fruits of their faith, which is the 
dissipation of their existential fears. Thus, the two thanatocentric hypotheses 
combine to predict a curvilinear (viz., negative quadratic) relationship between 
death anxiety and religious belief. 
 
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1. Predicted inverted U-shaped curve. 
 
A curvilinear relationship is also consistent with Terror Management 
Theory’s worldview defense account. Recall that on this view both religious 
and atheistic worldviews may serve to mitigate death anxiety. We might 
therefore expect—all things being equal—that people with neither religious nor 
antireligious commitments will experience high levels of death anxiety 
compared to those who either hold a strongly religious or strongly atheistic 
worldview. This is clearly a different causal account to the one described above; 
nevertheless, both accounts make the same prediction about the relationship 
between death anxiety and religiosity: an inverted-U curve. Correlational 
studies therefore cannot resolve this dispute between different thanatocentric 
accounts; conversely, a failure to find the hypothesized curvilinear relationship 
would provide a serious challenge to both.  
  
Previous reviews: fear(s) of death and religiosity 
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There is, as we shall see, a plethora of empirical studies designed to show how 
death anxiety and religiosity are related. Two previous attempts to survey this 
literature are particularly instructive.  
 First, Donovan’s (1994) survey of 137 studies found that 78 provided 
evidence for a negative relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, 
whereas 13 provided evidence for a positive relationship, and the remaining 46 
presented contradictory, null, or otherwise inconclusive findings. Among these 
46, there were also six studies that supported the curvilinearity hypothesis, 
suggesting that the relationship between death anxiety and religiosity forms an 
inverted-U pattern. Donovan argues that his survey provides tentative support 
for the curvilinearity hypothesis despite the paucity of direct evidence to the 
effect. To explain the apparent contradiction between studies that found 
positive and negative correlations, he conjectured that an important factor is 
differences in the religiosity of the samples: highly religious samples are likely 
to produce negative correlations, whereas highly nonreligious samples are 
likely to produce positive correlations. Similarly, to explain the null effects, he 
argued that this is consistent with an untested negative quadratic relationship: in 
a mixed sample, positive and negative linear relationships among nonreligious 
and religious participants respectively could cancel each other out. These 
conjectures enjoy a prima facie plausibility, but Donovan (1994) made little 
attempt to test them.  
 The second, more recent survey, by Ellis and Wahab (2013) did quantify 
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the effects of various sampling and methodological factors, but its scope was 
somewhat narrower. They reviewed 84 papers, from which they extracted 108 
effects. Of these, 40 showed a negative correlation between death anxiety and 
religiosity, 27 showed a positive correlation, and 32 showed no significant 
correlation in either direction, and nine provided support for the curvilinearity  
hypothesis. In addition, they examined whether other sample characteristics— 
such as age, gender, and religiosity—could help to explain the diverse results. 
While most of these analyses found null effects, there was some evidence that 
the negative correlations were driven by samples that skewed religious: 42% of 
the studies that found a negative correlation included only individuals who 
were moderately and strongly religious. Thus, like Donovan (1994), Ellis and 
Wahab (2013) concluded that “when nonreligious individuals are sampled 
alongside those who are both moderately and extremely religious, the overall 
relationship shifts to being curvilinear, and possibly even positive” (p. 149).  
 These two reviews provide the starting point for the present attempt to 
systematically survey existing evidence for thanatocentric hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, we believe that both reviews assumed too broad a definition of 
“death anxiety”, including different kinds of death-related attitudes (e.g., 
positive vs. negative attitudes) and emotions (e.g., depression). Furthermore, 
Donovan (1994) also conflated different measures of religiosity under the 
questionable assumption that they measure the same underlying constructs. 
Both reviews reported significant heterogeneity in findings, which they 
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attribute largely to sampling biases, but another possibility is that conflating 
different kinds of measures exacerbated the problem. Consequently, one of our 
key goals was to take a more targeted approach; we define dimensions of 
religiosity more precisely, both for theoretical reasons, and in an effort to 
reduce the heterogeneity encountered in previous reviews.  
  
“Death anxiety” and “religious belief” 
As we alluded to above, thanatocentric theories of religion are primarily 
concerned with the fear of one’s own death. This may be distinguished from the 
fear of the dying process (e.g., the pain involved), and the fear of others’ death 
and dying (Collett & Lester, 1969; Lester, 1990; Wittkowski, 2001). More 
specifically, following our reading of Malinowski (1948) and Becker (1973), our 
specific construct of concern is existential death anxiety, the fear of the 
“complete cessation” of life (e.g., Malinowski, 1948, p. 50) and of the 
“annihilation” of the self (or the “ego”; e.g., Becker, 1973, p. 288). This may be 
distinguished from other aspects of our own death that are potentially anxiety 
inducing, such as fears concerning loved ones left behind, or about the fate of 
our bodies and belongings.  
 These distinctions are important given the diversity of ways in which 
fears and anxieties about death have been measured. By far the most common 
measure of death anxiety is Templer’s (1970) Death Anxiety Scale (DAS; see 
also revisions of the DAS, Templer et al., 2006; Thorson & Powell, 1992), which 
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conflates various aspects of fear of death and dying, containing both general 
items about being “afraid to die” and also specific items about “a painful death” 
and even heart attacks, cancer, World War III, and corpses. The DAS is usually 
treated as a unidimensional measure of general death anxiety, but multiple 
factor analyses have shown that its underlying structure is multidimensional 
(e.g., Durlak, 1982; Gilliland & Templer, 1985; Levin, 1990; Lonetto, Fleming, & 
Mercer, 1979; Martin, 1982; Royal & Elahi, 2011; Tomás-Sábado & Gómez-
Benito, 2002).  
 More recently, however, there has been increasing recognition of the 
multidimensionality of death anxiety. Consequently, there are now various 
multidimensional scales, the most widely using being the Collett-Lester Fear of 
Death Scale (FOD; Lester, 1990), Hoelter’s Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale 
(MFODS; Hoelter, 1979), and Florian and Kravetz’s (1983) Fear of Personal 
Death Scale (FPODS). Each of these scales consists of multiple subscales that are 
intended to capture particular dimensions of death anxiety. The Collett-Lester 
FOD distinguishes the fear of death from the fear of dying, and fears concerning 
oneself from fears concerning others. MFODS comprises eight subscales—the 
fear of the dying process, of the dead, of being destroyed, for significant others, 
of the unknown, of conscious death, for the body after death, and of premature 
death—none of which appear to capture the fear of annihilation as described 
above. The fear of the unknown comes closest, but may be confounded with 
religiosity, as it contains items about afterlife and God beliefs. FOPDS 
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comprises six subscales—the fear of the loss of self-fulfilment, of the loss of 
social identity, of consequences to family and friends, of transcendental 
consequences, of punishment in the hereafter, and of self-annihilation—the last 
of which enjoys face validity as a measure of our construct of interest.   
 Measures of death anxiety are diverse: different scales and subscales 
measure different aspects of death anxiety, not all of which are theoretically 
relevant for our purposes. There is an analogous problem in the measurement 
of religiosity. Following most thanatocentric theorists of religion, our primary 
interest is in religious belief: the belief in supernatural agents, particularly those 
relevant to the afterlife. However, many studies employ “hodgepodge” 
measures of religiosity that conflate various kinds of religious attitudes and 
behaviours (Gorsuch, 1984, p. 234). Furthermore, among the most common 
religiosity measures are measures of religious orientation, of the manner in 
which an individual approaches religion. Measures of religious orientation are 
not very useful for evaluating thanatocentric theories of religion, as such 
theories do not generate hypotheses about religious orientation. Nevertheless, 
some measures of religious orientation may plausibly be used as proxies for an 
individual’s commitment to her religious worldview.   
  Given the diversity in the measurement of death- and religiosity-related 
constructs, it is perhaps unsurprising that previous reviews have found such 
heterogeneous associations. In an attempt to reduce this heterogeneity, we 
restricted our systematic review and meta-analysis to a narrower range of 
 
14 
measures, and, following Ellis and Wahab (2013), made distinctions between 
categories of measures where possible (see Method below). Like Ellis and 
Wahab (2013), we conducted a systematic review of the literature, but we also 
supplemented this with estimates of aggregate effect sizes for each category of 
religiosity measures.  
 
Method 
Search and Selection  
To ensure as exhaustive a collection as possible, we searched for potentially 
relevant research articles in multiple databases, using the following Boolean 
search phrase: “("death anxiety" OR "fear of death" OR "fear of dying" OR 
"death fear" OR "attitudes towards death" OR "attitudes to death") AND 
("religiosity" OR "religion" OR "faith" OR "spirituality" OR "spiritual" OR 
“afterlife”)”. This search was first conducted in Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, 
and ProQuest, and then also in two specific journals—Omega: Journal of Death 
and Dying, and Death Studies (where many relevant articles were found, based 
on our database search).  
 Our searches produced 464 initial hits. We rejected 322 of these from 
further consideration because their abstracts suggested that they did not 
measure either religiosity or death anxiety. For the remaining 142 articles, the 
methods and results sections were consulted to ascertain whether the measures 
used were relevant, and whether the relevant statistics were reported. Articles 
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were retained if they met all four of the following criteria: (1) they measured the 
fear of one’s own death or dying (as opposed to the fear of others’ death; or 
other death-related constructs, such as obsession and depression; Abdel-
Khalek, 1998; Templer, Lavoie, Chalgujian, & Thomas-Dobson, 1990); (2) they 
measured aspects of religiosity, including religious beliefs, behaviour, identity, 
and/or orientation; (3) they examined the relationship between death anxiety 
and religiosity; and (4) they reported effects from which correlation coefficients 
can be estimated.   
 Based on these criteria, 100 articles were included in our quantitative 
analyses. Twenty-five further articles fulfilled all but the final criterion (i.e., 
adequate information for effect size estimation)1. Of the 100 articles, 92 tested 
linear relationships, or otherwise made categorical comparisons between more 
and less religious groups. Very few studies sampled sufficient numbers of 
nonreligious participants to enable the curvilinearity hypothesis to be tested2. 
Recall that the curvilinearity hypothesis encompasses both religious and 
nonreligious individuals: a positive correlation between death anxiety and 
religiosity is expected among nonreligious individuals, whereas a negative 
correlation is expected among religious individuals. Thanatocentric theories 
differ on their causal account of this pattern, but agree on the shape of the 
pattern itself. However, insofar as very few existing studies sample sufficient 
                                                 
1 Further information about all 125 articles are included in Supplementary Materials. 
2 Of the 100 studies, only 72 reported enough information to ascertain the proportion 
of nonreligious participants. 24.5% of these had no nonreligious participants at all; 
56.9% had samples that consisted of 10% or fewer nonreligious participants. The mean 
proportion of nonreligious participants per sample was 12.87% (SD = 16.61). 
 
16 
numbers of nonreligious individuals, they are unable to test the curvilinearity 
hypothesis at all. In this case, thanatocentric theories would simply predict a 
negative linear effect, consistent with the notion that religiosity mitigates death 
anxiety among religious individuals. Thus, we estimated linear effects in our 
meta-analyses; in addition, we paid special attention to those studies that tested 
for curvilinearity. Finally, as Ellis and Wahab (2013) have also observed, the 
likelihood of finding a negative quadratic pattern should increase as the 
proportion of nonreligious participants in a sample increases; as nonreligious 
participants outnumber religious participants, we might even expect a shift 
toward a positive correlation. We therefore also estimated whether the percent 
of participants who were nonreligious predicted effect sizes.  
  
Effect size selection and conversion 
From the 100 studies, it was possible to extract 272 effect sizes, as many studies 
used multiple measures of death anxiety and religiosity. We reduced the 
number of effect sizes to 202 by selecting only the most relevant measure of 
death anxiety for each sample, and the most relevant measure of religiosity for 
each religiosity category for each sample. In keeping with our theoretical 
concerns and our reading of thanatocentric theories, our primary construct of 
interest was the fear of one’s own death, as distinct from the fear of dying, and 
the fear of others’ death and dying (Collett & Lester, 1969). In particular, we 
were most interested in the fear of the cessation of life or the extinction of the 
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self, as distinct from other aspects of death. Thus, in selecting death anxiety 
measures, we prioritized measures of the fear of personal annihilation or 
extinction (e.g., FPODS “fear of personal annihilation” subscale; MFODS “fear 
of the unknown” subscale), followed by more general measures of the fear of 
one’s own death (e.g., Collett-Lester “fear of death”). Finally, we also retained 
general measures of death anxiety, such as Templer’s DAS, if neither of the 
previous two kinds of measures were used. Although such measures do not 
specifically target our construct, we assume that they serve as adequate proxies. 
Supporting our assumption, previous research has shown Templer’s DAS 
scores to be highly correlated with the Collett-Lester “fear of death of self” 
subscale, relative to its other subscales (Abdel-Khalek, 2002; Lester, 1990). Other 
general measures, many of which derived from DAS, were retained when a 
more specific measure was not available (e.g., Conte, Weiner, & Plutchik, 1982; 
Templer et al., 2006; Thorson & Powell, 1992).  
 There was much less redundancy among religiosity measures, especially 
after they were categorized into four groups: general/composite measures of 
religiosity, measures of religious belief, measures of religious behaviour, 
measures of religious orientation. As we were most interested in religious 
belief, whenever multiple measures of each type were used in a sample, we 
retained the measure that we felt was most indicative of religious belief (e.g., 
private religious behaviours were preferred over public ones)3.  
                                                 
3 The effects that were dropped are reported in Supplementary Materials. 
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Most studies reported the association between death anxiety and 
religiosity as a Person correlation coefficient (r). When other measures of the 
association were reported (e.g., mean differences, t-test, odds ratio, χ2, etc.) we 
transformed them to r (see Card, 2011; Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). If 
only the significance level of an r, t, or F statistic was reported, we estimated the 
effect size by assigning the minimum r that would provide that level of 
significance given the sample size; if the effect size was reported as not 
significant or p > .05, r was estimated as 0 (Card, 2011).  
 
[Figure 2] 
Figure 2. PRISMA flow diagram. 
 
Summary of Meta-analysis 
We first performed an “omnibus analysis” in which all religiosity effect sizes 
were pooled together across religiosity categories; this analysis provides the 
broadest overview of the available research findings. In addition, because 
different dimensions of religiosity might show different associations with death 
anxiety, we also performed a series of meta-analyses that examined the four 
categories independently: general/composite measures of religiosity, measures 
of religious belief, measures of religious behaviour, and measures of religious 
orientation. 
 For each meta-analysis, we converted r scores into Fisher’s z-scores to 
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estimate uncertainty in effect sizes, and back-transformed Fisher’s z-scores to r 
scores for interpretation (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). The meta-analyses were 
conducted using the R package Metafor using a random-effects model with the 
restricted maximum-likelihood estimator of heterogeneity and the Knapp and 
Hartung adjustment (Team, 2013; Viechtbauer, 2010). To index heterogeneity 
we used Q statistics (Cochran, 1954) and I2 indices (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, 
& Altman, 2003). To examine potential moderators of effect sizes (percent non-
religious, percent female, and mean age), we used random-effects meta-
regression. We used funnel plots to examine the evidence for publication bias. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Overview and Omnibus Meta-analysis 
An initial view of the 202 results presents a chaotic picture. By far the most 
common result—accounting for more than half the effects (n = 106)—is a null 
finding: that is, no significant linear effect in either direction. The next most 
common finding (n = 60) was a negative correlation between religiosity and 
death anxiety; the remaining 36 effects were positive correlations. Thus, as did 
Donovan (1994) and Ellis and Wahab (2013), we see that existing findings are 
very heterogeneous. 
 Before conducting an omnibus meta-analysis, we eliminated 
nonindependent observations by calculating an average effect size whenever 
multiple effect sizes were reported for any sample (i.e., multiple measures of 
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religiosity). The omnibus meta-analysis of all 113 effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(112) = 801.12, p < .01; I2 = 83.66%. The average association 
between death anxiety and omnibus religiosity was r = −.06 (95% CI [−.09, −.02], 
p < .01), providing evidence for a small negative association (see Supplementary 
Materials for forest plots of all meta-analyses). The proportion of nonreligious 
participants (% nonreligious) was available for 80 effect sizes. Across these 80 
effect sizes, associations between death anxiety and religiosity were not found 
to be moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 78) = 2.17, p = .15. The high 
heterogeneity compromises the meaningfulness of this estimate, so the precise 
magnitude of the overall effect size should be interpreted with considerable 
caution. In fact, given the diversity of measures of religiosity in this omnibus 
meta-analysis this high level of heterogeneity is not unexpected.  
 In the remainder of this section of the paper, we report the results of 
meta-analyses performed separately for different categories of religious 
measures. A summary of the findings may be found in Table 1 below. 
 
General measures of religiosity 
There were 42 general measures of religiosity effect sizes. Of these, 26 showed 
no statistically significant linear relationship between death anxiety and 
religiosity; 11 showed a negative relationship; and 5 showed a positive 
relationship. As before, the meta-analysis of 42 general religiosity effect sizes 
showed high heterogeneity, Q(41) = 352.90, p < .01; I2 = 85.50%. The average 
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association between death anxiety and general religiosity was r = −.05 (95% CI 
[−.10, .00], p = .07), providing no evidence for an association. Across the 30 effect 
sizes that included % non-religious, associations were not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 28) = .15, p = .70.  
 As discussed earlier, such “hodgepodge” measures of religiosity either 
conflate multiple aspects of religiosity together, or attempt to approximate 
“general religiosity” via single broad items. Such attempts problematically 
assume a monolithic view of religiosity, rather than fractionating this complex 
phenomenon into distinct variables of interest. Our primary variable of interest 
is religious belief—the belief in supernatural entities, including those that 
enable literal immortality—and these general/composite measures were 
intended to serve as proxies for religious belief. Fortunately, many of the 
studies we found included more direct measures of religious belief. 
 
Measures of religious belief 
There were 73 religious belief effect sizes. Of these, 43 showed no statistically 
significant relationship with death anxiety; 23 showed a negative relationship; 
and 7 showed a positive relationship.  
 Some studies reported correlations for multiple distinct measures of 
religious belief (e.g., belief in God, belief in afterlife). For these studies, we 
computed mean religious belief scores before running a meta-analysis. This 
meta-analysis of 59 religious belief effect sizes showed high heterogeneity, 
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Q(58) = 474.44, p < .01; I2 = 82.19%. The average association between death 
anxiety and religious belief was r = −.07 (95% CI [−.11, −.03], p < .01), providing 
evidence for a small negative association. Across the 38 effect sizes that 
included % non-religious, associations were moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 
36) = 4.82, p = .03. However, this association must be interpreted with some 
caution due to the existence of an outlier.4  
 Next, we ran a meta-analysis that focused exclusively on afterlife beliefs. 
In this case, whenever multiple religious belief measures were used in the same 
sample, instead of averaging effect sizes, we retained only the afterlife belief 
measures. This meta-analysis of 35 afterlife belief effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(33) = 248.54, p < .01; I2 = 79.44%. The average association 
between death anxiety and afterlife beliefs was r = −.06 (95% CI [−.11, −.01], p = 
.03), providing evidence for a small negative association. Across the 24 effect 
sizes that included % non-religious, associations were not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 2) = .02, p = .89. 
 
Measures of religious behaviour 
As religious belief is often highly correlated with religious behaviour, we also 
looked at the correlation between religious behaviour and death anxiety 
separately, to see if the results are consistent with those on religious belief. 
There were 30 effects on measures of religious behaviour. Of these, 12 showed 
                                                 
4 The association is not statistically significant when the two data points from the 
study that included this influential case are removed, F(1, 34) = .43, p = .52. 
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no statistically significant relationship between death anxiety and religiosity; 11 
showed a negative relationship5; and 7 showed a positive relationship. 
 This meta-analysis of 30 religious behaviour effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(29) = 414.37, p < .01; I2 = 91.72%. The average association 
between death anxiety and religious behaviour was r = −.08 (95% CI [−.15, −.01], 
p = .03), providing evidence for a small negative association. Across the 22 effect 
sizes that included % non-religious, these associations were not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 20) = 2.36, p = .14. 
 
Measures of religious orientation 
Finally, we turn to religious orientation. There were 57 religious orientation 
effect sizes. Of these, 25 showed no statistically significant relationship; while 16 
showed a negative relationship, and 16 a positive relationship. As 50 of the 57 
effect sizes involved either measures of intrinsic motivation or extrinsic 
motivation, we focused on these two constructs in our meta-analyses6.  
  Researchers have tended to emphasize the positive effects of intrinsic 
religiosity and the negative effects of extrinsic religiosity: indeed, as Kirkpatrick 
and Hood (1990) have observed, intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity has typically 
                                                 
5 Two effects were reported as significant in the original papers, but were marginally- 
and nonsignificant once linear contrasts were calculated and transformed into r scores. 
We categorized these effects based on our transformation: the marginal effect was 
retained as negative, while the nonsignificant effect was treated as null.  
6 The remaining seven effects, reported across five studies, measured quest (n = 2) and 
fundamentalist (n = 5) religiosity. One study found a positive correlation between quest 
and death anxiety, whereas the other found no association. One study found three 
positive effects across three samples between fundamentalism and death anxiety; 
another two studies found no association. 
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be treated as “good” and “bad” forms of religiosity respectively. Even Gordon 
Allport (e.g., 1950) himself, to whom the distinction is attributed, referred to 
them as mature and immature religiosity. According to Allport and Ross (1967, 
p. 434), the extrinsically religious individual “uses his religion”, whereas the 
intrinsically religious individual “lives [it]”. That is, the extrinsic orientation is a 
disposition to “use religion for [one’s] own ends”; religious beliefs are thus 
“lightly held or else selectively shaped” in an “instrumental and utilitarian” 
fashion. In contrast, the intrinsic orientation is a disposition to treat one’s 
religion as ultimate, with all other concerns deprioritized; religious belief is 
embraced, and the individual “endeavours to internalize it and follow it fully”. 
Thus, intrinsic religiosity has also been construed as “true belief”, whereas 
extrinsic religiosity has been thought of as disingenuous participation on 
religion (e.g., Carroll, 2010; Cicirelli, 2002; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). 
Consistent with this “good-religion-versus-bad-religion” view (Kirkpatrick & 
Hood, 1990, p. 442), intrinsic religiosity has also previously been empirically 
associated with psychological well-being (Ventis, 1995), meaning in life (e.g., 
Donahue, 1985), and even recovery from illness (Koenig, George, & Peterson, 
1998), whereas such benefits are generally found to be unrelated to extrinsic 
religiosity, which instead predicts negative outcomes such as poorer mental 
health (Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993) and racial prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 
2010). Given the values attached to intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity in previous 
research, we might be led to expect that intrinsic religiosity is negatively 
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correlated with death anxiety, while extrinsic religiosity is positively correlated 
with death anxiety. Our findings find some support for this hypothesis. Of the 
30 effect sizes reported on intrinsic religiosity, 15 were negative, while the 
remaining 15 were nonsignificant. Similarly, of the 20 effect sizes reported on 
extrinsic religiosity, 13 were positive, while the remaining 7 were 
nonsignificant.  
 The meta-analysis of 30 intrinsic religiosity effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(29) = 206.92, p <.01; I2 = 85.15%. The average association 
between death anxiety and intrinsic religiosity was r = −.21 (95% CI [−.29, −.13]), 
p < .01), providing evidence for a small to medium negative association. Across 
the 26 effect sizes that included % nonreligious, this effect was not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 24) = .59, p = .45.  
 The meta-analysis of 20 extrinsic religiosity effect sizes showed high 
heterogeneity, Q(19) = 107.28, p < .01; I2 = 82.02%. The average association 
between death anxiety and extrinsic religiosity was r = .27 (95% CI [.18, .35], p < 
.01), providing evidence for a small to medium positive association. Across the 
18 effect sizes that included % nonreligious, this effect was not found to be 
moderated by % nonreligious, F(1, 16) = 1.20, p = .29.  
 For both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, the aggregated associations 
were, on average, larger than for the other measures of religiosity. This is not 
only consistent with the “good-religion-versus-bad-religion” view mentioned 
earlier, but also with a curvilinear effect of religious belief on death anxiety, on 
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the assumption that intrinsic religiosity represents a stronger or more authentic 
form of religious commitment (e.g., Carroll, 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; 
see also Wink & Scott, 2005), at least for religious participants about whom it 
makes sense to talk about religious orientation at all. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of meta-analysis results 
Category n.s. negative positive r 95% CI I2 
General measures 26 11 5 −.05 −.10, .00 85.50% 
Religious belief 43 23 7 −.07 −.11, −.03 82.19% 
Afterlife belief* 23 10 2 −.06 −.11, −.01 79.44% 
Religious behaviour 12 11 7 −.08 −.15, −.01 91.72% 
Intrinsic religiosity 15 15 0 −.21 −.29, −.13 85.15% 
Extrinsic religiosity 7 0 13 0.27 .18, .35 82.02% 
*Afterlife belief measures form a proper subset of measures of religious belief 
  
Publication bias 
The funnel plot for the omnibus analysis appears to be relatively symmetric (see 
Supplementary Materials) and Egger’s regression test for funnel plot 
asymmetry was not statistically significant (t = -1.3, p = .20), which suggests that 
publication bias has had little influence on the meta-analysis. Although we have 
not found evidence for publication bias, absence of evidence should be 
interpreted with some caution. First, even when publication bias is present it 
can be difficult to identify (Sterne et al., 2011; Terrin, Schmid, & Lau, 2005). 
Second, given that different research groups makes different predictions about 
associations (i.e. negative, positive, or curvilinear) it is possible that results that 
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did not support hypotheses were not reported, and these suppressed results 
“average out”, resulting in a relatively symmetrical funnel plot. 
 
A curvilinear relationship? 
Prima facie, the general picture seems like bad news for thanatocentric accounts 
of religion, including the worldview defense account of terror management. 
Recall that these theories predict a curvilinear relationship between death 
anxiety and religiosity, which should manifest as a negative linear correlation in 
samples that are predominantly religious. Our review and meta-analyses thus 
far has provided little evidence for this. First, although estimated aggregated 
effect sizes are generally negative, which is consistent with the curvilinearity 
hypothesis (because most studies were run on predominantly religious 
samples), these effects were also very small. Second, there seems to be little 
consistency across studies: for most religiosity constructs, there were studies 
that found positive, negative, and null associations. This observation of 
heterogeneity is further supported by Q and I2 statistics. Third, more than half 
of the effect sizes reported indicated no linear association between religiosity 
and death anxiety; even in the case of our religiosity construct of primary 
interest, 62.67% of the effects showed no association. Finally, concerning the 
curvilinearity hypothesis more specifically, there was little evidence that the 
proportion of nonreligious participants in the sample affected the associations. 
The only exception to this was in the relationship between death anxiety and 
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religious belief. However, this result was driven by Jong, Bluemke, and 
Halberstadt’s (2013) study that had the highly unusual property of sampling 
equal numbers of religious and nonreligious participants, and reported effect 
sizes for them separately as separate groups. Indeed, in having a 100% 
nonreligious sample, Jong et al.’s (2013) study was the only one to report a 
sample with % nonreligious figures above 50%. This is not to suggest that the 
association between % nonreligious and death anxiety is a statistical artifact. 
Rather, there is insufficient evidence draw firm conclusions. This result 
highlights the importance of reporting raw data in psychology research. Had 
earlier studies reported raw data then we could have split groups ourselves into 
religious and nonreligious subgroups to test the curvilinear hypothesis with 
greater rigour. 
 It is possible that the preponderance of null findings conceals an 
underlying nonlinear relationship, such as a negative quadratic one in which 
nonreligious individuals fear death more as their religious beliefs (such as they 
are) increase, while religious individuals show the opposite pattern. 
Unfortunately, as noted above, only eight of the 100 studies we included in our 
meta-analysis tested for nonlinear effects. A further three were found in the 
larger initial set of 125. Of these 11, 10 provided some evidence for a curvilinear 
relationship, and only one found no such association.  
 Nelson (1974) provides perhaps the earliest direct evidence of a 
curvilinear relationship. The sample, though, impressively large (N = 1,279) 
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was, unfortunately, only of men who self-identified as Christian. The study 
found that death anxiety was lowest among individuals who attended church 
least (“never”) or scored lowest on measures of private religious devotion, 
experience, and belief, as well as those who attended church most (“at least 
weekly”) or scored highest on other dimensions of religiosity; conversely, death 
anxiety was highest among those who only went to church “occasionally, but 
less often than monthly” or had low-to-moderate scores on other religiosity 
dimensions (e.g., private religious devotion). Individuals who were moderately 
religious (e.g., attending church monthly or more) were more similar to those 
who were devoutly religious than those who were moderately irreligious. 
Nelson reported regression analyses that provided evidence both for a linear 
positive correlation between death anxiety and these different aspects of 
religiosity (driven, it appears, by the steep increase between the very irreligious 
and the slightly religious), as well as the predicted inverted-U quadratic 
pattern.    
 Similarly, Leming (1980; N = 372) measured different aspects of 
religiosity—religious belief, religious ritual participation, and religious 
experience—to examine relationships with death anxiety, which he measured 
using his own Leming Death Fear scale. This he treated as a unidimensional 
measure, even though it contains items pertaining to various aspects of death 
anxiety. In contrast to Nelson’s (1974) study, Leming (1980) found a negative 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, for all three aspects of 
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religiosity he studied. However, a close inspection of Leming’s data suggests 
that death anxiety initially rises with religiosity when religiosity levels are low. 
For the moderately to strongly religious individuals, however, death anxiety 
declines. Leming’s (1980) own interpretation of this finding is that religion both 
causes and alleviates the fear of death; it causes anxiety by introducing ideas 
about post-mortem judgment and the possibility of divine punishment, and 
only alleviates it when believers are sufficiently committed, aware of their 
commitment, and concomitantly confident of their salvation. 
 McMordie (1981; N = 320) had participants self-classify their degree of 
religiosity, as “extremely religious”, “very religious”, “somewhat religious”, 
“slightly religious”, “not at all religious”, or “anti-religious”. As might be 
expected, only a handful of individuals considered themselves either extremely 
religious (n = 9) or anti-religious (n = 14), whereas most people either identified 
as somewhat (n = 123) or slightly (n = 86) religious. Using a modified version of 
Templer’s Death Anxiety Scale, he found an inverted-U curve: those who were 
“slightly” and “somewhat” religious reported the highest levels of death 
anxiety, whereas the “extremely religious” and “anti-religious” reported the 
lowest levels of death anxiety. This pattern of results is slightly different from 
either Leming’s (1980) or Nelson’s (1974) in that there is no evidence of a linear 
relationship, either positive or negative. McMordie’s interpretation of these 
findings also differs: he posits that it is the strength of one’s conviction—
independent of the content of the belief system—that reduces death anxiety. In 
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other words, McMordie (1981) represents a precursor to the worldview defense 
account of terror management.  
 Downey (1984) studied 237 middle-aged men, using Boyar’s Fear of 
Death Scale and her own composite measure of religiosity that included 
elements of religious belief, behaviour, experience, and the perceived effects of 
religiosity; six of the 13 items in the scale pertained to religious beliefs. She 
found no evidence of a linear relationship but, dividing her sample into low, 
moderate, and high religiosity groups—she found an inverted-U relationship 
between death anxiety and religiosity: as before, the moderate religiosity group 
reported higher levels of death anxiety than did the other two groups. She too 
concluded that “strength of religious commitment is the most significant 
variable in explaining the relationship between religion and fear of death” (p. 
820). 
 Aday’s (1985) study of 181 college students focused on afterlife belief, 
but also measured frequency of church attendance, and intensity or strength of 
religious belief. He reported a weak negative correlation between afterlife belief 
(Osarchuk & Tatz, 1973) and death anxiety (Templer, 1970), but did not attempt 
to test for nonlinear effects. He does, however, note that individuals who only 
went to church monthly reported higher levels of death anxiety than did 
individuals who went weekly or seldom. A similar pattern holds for the 
measure of participants’ intensity of religious belief. Aday provided no 
substantive theoretical interpretation of these findings. 
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 Wink and Scott (2005; N = 155) ran a study on older participants (in their 
60s and 70s), and found no linear relationship between participants’ religiosity 
(including both belief and behaviour components) and their fear of death or 
fear of dying; however, they did find an inverted-U relationship between 
religiosity and fear of death (but not fear of dying). Wink and Scott (2005) also 
provided evidence for the view that consistency between belief and behaviour is 
important in reducing death anxiety: participants who held positive views of 
the afterlife but scored low on other measures of religiosity (e.g., behaviour, 
belief) reported the highest levels of death anxiety. Wink and Scott (2005) tie 
these findings directly to those were reviewed above about the divergence 
between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, arguing that extrinsic religiosity does 
not mitigate death anxiety because it involves an inconsistency between (true) 
belief and (superficial) participation. 
 A recent study complicates Wink and Scott’s (2005) interpretation 
somewhat. Wen (2012; N = 236) used Hoge’s Intrinsic Religious Motivation 
scale, and treated intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as two ends of a continuum. 
In this study, as in many other studies included in our meta-analysis, extrinsic 
religiosity was positively correlated with death anxiety; however, there was 
also a curvilinear trend, such that both highly intrinsically and highly 
extrinsically motivated religious individuals reported lower levels of death 
anxiety than did individuals whose religious orientations were less clearly 
defined. This finding is inconsistent with Wink and Scott’s (2005) idea that 
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death anxiety should be correlated with intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity in 
opposite directions: in this case, lower death anxiety is associated with both 
high levels of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Perhaps then, even extrinsic 
religiosity has its benefits, at least for people who are solidly of that disposition. 
Insofar as this finding challenges the “good-religion-versus-bad-religion” view 
of religious orientation that Wink and Scott (2005) adopt, it also challenges the 
relevance of these constructs for our theoretical purposes. Fortunately, in 
addition to religious orientation, Wen’s study also investigated frequency of 
religious attendance and strength of religious belief. In the former case, high 
religious attendance was associated with low death anxiety, but there was also 
a curvilinear relationship consistent with other studies just described. However, 
death anxiety and strength of religious belief—measured via a single question, 
“How strong is your religious belief?”—were conspicuously unassociated.  
 Wen’s (2012) null findings with respect to strength of religious belief are 
in contrast with work by Jong et al. (2013; N = 213). In this study, a deliberate 
effort was made to obtain a sample with an approximately equally split 
between religious and nonreligious individuals. When collapsing across 
religious and nonreligious participants, no linear association between death 
anxiety and religious belief was found. However, splitting the sample into 
religious (n = 66) and nonreligious (n = 81) subsamples, revealed a clear 
difference: the correlation between death anxiety and religious belief was 
positive for individuals who identified as nonreligious (including atheists and 
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agnostics), and negative for those who identified as religious.    
 Of the eleven studies that tested the curvilinearity hypotheses, these 
eight provide consistent support for an inverted-U relationship between 
religiosity and death anxiety, across diverse measures of religiosity (e.g., belief, 
service attendance)7. Two others provide more qualified support. First, Power 
and Smith (2008), who analyzed self-reported religiosity (“not at all religious” 
to “very religious”) found only “a potential curvilinear effect” on two subscales 
out of Hoelter’s MOFDS’s eight, namely “fear of the unknown” and “fear of 
conscious death”. As alluded to earlier, it is “fear of the unknown” that is most 
relevant to our interests: so, even though the other subscales revealed no such 
pattern, Power and Smith (2008) seems to have found some, albeit weak, 
support for a curvilinear relationship on the most relevant construct.  
 The second study that provided only qualified support for the 
curvilinear hypothesis is by Ellis, Wahab, and Ratsaningan (2013). They 
collected data in Malaysia (n = 2396), the United States (n = 1291), and Turkey (n 
= 265), which allowed them to make both cross-cultural and interreligious 
comparisons. They found that individuals who self-identified as nonreligious 
reported the lowest levels of death anxiety, Muslims reported the highest, and 
Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists sat somewhere in between. In contrast to the 
aggregate effects we found in our meta-analyses, they also found positive linear 
relationships, between death anxiety and various other single-item measures of 
                                                 
7 Furthermore, consistent with our systematic review, the findings regarding linear 
effects were heterogeneous, and the most common result was no significant association 
(see Supplementary Material).  
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religiosity, including measures of belief in God, belief in an afterlife, and 
religious observance. They also reported curve estimations for each of their 
single-item measures, separately for each country. Although they did find 
evidence of curvilinearity—on most measures in each country, negative 
quadratic functions fit the data—the linear effects were generally stronger than 
the quadratic ones, at least in Malaysia and Turkey. In the United States, 
however, the quadratic patterns were much more evident, and the curvilinear 
relationships were stronger than the linear ones. Thus, while Ellis et al.’s (2013) 
findings do not contradict the curvilinearity hypothesis, they do alert us to the 
potential cultural contingency of patterns. Indeed, even comparing Malaysia 
and Turkey, both of which are majority Muslim countries (approximately 60% 
in Malaysia, over 90% in Turkey), the patterns of correlations display some 
interesting differences; for example, the beliefs in God and immortality linearly 
predict death anxiety in Malaysia, but not in Turkey.   
 Indeed, among those testing nonlinear effects, the only study to not find 
an inverted-U pattern, is Feifel and Nagy (1981; N = 616). They found no 
curvilinear relationship between Collett-Lester’s fear of death subscale and 
Hoge’s intrinsic religiosity measure. However, it is not clear how generalizable 
these findings are: Feifel and Nagy’s (1981) sample consisted of alcoholics (n = 
123), drug addicts (n = 115), inmates (n = 92), deputy sheriffs (n = 143), and only 
143 members of the general public. Furthermore, as Feifel and Nagy (1981) did 
not to test for nonlinear effects using other measures of religiosity (e.g., belief, 
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behaviour), their results do not provide strong disconfirmation of the 
hypothesis.  
 Although our meta-analyses did not provide direct evidence for the 
curvilinearity hypothesis, and only weak indirect evidence in the form of small 
negative correlations, a closer examination of the 11 studies that deliberately 
tested a curvilinear relationship is suggestive. Of these 11, eight provided firm 
support for the curvilinearity hypothesis; two studies provided some support, 
and one study provided disconfirmatory evidence. Furthermore, Ellis et al.’s 
(2013) three-nation analyses raise questions about the cultural contingency of 
the relationship between death anxiety and religiosity that future research 
should explore. 
 An important limitation of our meta-analysis was that statistics reported 
in papers tended to be reported in a manner that made it difficult to rigorously 
evaluate evidence for the curvilinearity hypothesis. In particular, in only one 
study (Jong et al., 2013) were participants divided into a nonreligious sample 
and a religious sample before analysis. Given that the curvilinearity hypothesis 
makes different predictions for these subgroups, the aggregate effect will tend 
to get swamped be the subgroup that dominates numerically. This is of 
particular concern because, as we have seen, the majority of the published 
studies included very few nonreligious participants in their sample. Future 
research could address this issue by taking an individual participant approach 
to meta-analysis, which would involve requesting data from the authors of 
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studies to divide analyses into religious and nonreligious subgroups. Such an 
analysis could play a crucial role in testing the curvilinear hypothesis more 
rigorously.   
  
Conclusion 
There is no shortage of empirical research examining relationships between trait 
levels of death anxiety and religiosity. There is, however, little consensus about 
the relationship; studies have reported negative, positive, and null linear effects, 
and our estimates confirmed these high levels of heterogeneity. Although our 
meta-analyses indicated weak negative correlations between most aspects of 
religiosity and death anxiety (extrinsic religious orientation being a notable 
exception), the aggregated effect sizes were very small. Given the sampling 
biases—most of the studies were on predominantly religious participants—
these negative correlations could be taken as indirect evidence for the 
curvilinearity hypothesis: they represent the right-hand side of the inverted-U 
curve. Furthermore, only 11 studies reported testing for curvilinear 
relationships, and of these, 10 provided some support for an inverted-U 
relationship. It is possible that other studies could have found similar results 
had they tested for a negative quadratic relationship, but we have no direct 
evidence for this.  
  Thanatocentric theories of religion generally predict an inverted-U 
relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, such that death anxiety is 
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lowest among very nonreligious (e.g., atheists) and very religious individuals, 
and highest among their less certain counterparts. Our systematic review and 
meta-analyses provide some evidence for such a pattern, but our conclusions 
require some qualification. First, aggregate effect sizes were very small; if there 
is a curvilinear relationship between death anxiety and religiosity, it is a weak 
one. Furthermore, there was little evidence that the proportion of 
religious/nonreligious participants in the samples affected the outcome of the 
meta-analyses. Nor did examining different aspects of religiosity separately 
make much of a difference, though the distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic religious orientation once again proved important (see also Cohen et 
al., 2005). The cause of the high heterogeneity across effect sizes has yet to be 
identified, and this renders interpretation difficult. This should therefore be a 
priority in future research. Finally, although 10 out of 11 of the studies that 
deliberately tested the curvilinearity provided some support for it, there was 
also some evidence of cross-cultural and/or interreligious variation. More cross-
cultural data are required before we can make general claims about the 
relationship between death anxiety and religion.  
 Although various thanatocentric theories of religion predict the same 
inverted-U pattern, they have different causal explanations. It is possible, for 
example, that religiosity increases with death anxiety until the individual in 
question believes, at which point her religiosity decreases her death anxiety 
(Jong et al., 2013). It is also possible, however, as the worldview defense account 
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of Terror Management Theory says, that baseline levels of death anxiety are 
high, but that strong religious or nonreligious commitments both decrease 
death anxiety (e.g., Landau, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2004). It is also possible 
that religiosity increases death anxiety—for example, by raising the possibility 
of divine wrath and postmortem punishment—at low levels, but decreases it at 
high levels, when individuals are more certain of their salvation (Homans, 
1941). Correlational evidence cannot resolve these theoretical disputes, as there 
are disagreements about causal processes. Rather, what is needed next is an 
experimental approach to testing thanatocentric theories of religion. 
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